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Abstract 
 
VANESSA SYLVIE AMÉLIE PELLETIER:  In the Time of Bergson: The Influence of 
the Philosophical Thoughts of Henri Bergson on the Writings and Music of Dane 
Rudhyar 
(Under the direction of Severine Neff) 
 
This thesis examines the influence of Bergsonian philosophy in the music and 
musical aesthetics of Dane Rudhyar. While most studies dealing with the music of 
Rudhyar acknowledge his early interest in the philosophies of Bergson (1859-1941), the 
extent of their influence on his musical writings and musical style have been largely 
underrated. Although Rudhyar became highly involved with esoteric thought shortly after 
his arrival in America in 1916, Bergsonian concepts continued to permeate Rudhyar‟s 
aesthetic writings on the mystical power of the arts throughout his life. Concepts 
discussed in Bergson‟s book Évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution; 1907), can be seen 
at work in Rudhyar‟s music. When analyzed using the Bergsonian concepts of duration, 
élan vital, Becoming, and Creative Evolution, Rudhyar‟s music begins to yield 
interesting and fascinating results, and particular aspects of his musical style come to the 
forefront. In addition, a certain metaphysical meaning begins to emerge. 
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Introduction 
 
  
Dane Rudhyar (1895-1985) is a fascinating figure for the history of American 
modern culture. Nonetheless, the extent of his influence on the musical scene and as I 
shall argue, particularly on composer Aaron Copland (1900-1990), remains insufficiently 
explored.
1
 Like many other artists of the twentieth century, Rudhyar was interested in 
exploring the interrelations between different branches of the arts, philosophy, and 
esoteric, occult traditions such as Theosophy, Rosicrucianism, alchemy, astrology, 
Baha‟i, and Buddhism, as well as the philosophies of modern writers such as Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Nietzsche and, most notaby Henri Bergson. However, 
his eclecticism and integration of different approaches, although they were in the service 
of a particular totality of vision, made his musical works very hard to understand for both 
the general public and many composers and performers. In addition, this has made his 
contributions difficult to assess through more traditional modes of research. As Deniz 
Ertan has stated, “Although his creative works can hint at certain artistic movements or 
aesthetic styles, they neither represent nor are adequately explained by them.”2 
                                                 
1
 Current studies on the musical relationship between Rudhyar and Copland include Carol Oja, Making 
Music Modern: New York in the 1920s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Carol Oja, “Dane 
Rudhyar‟s Vision of American Dissonance,” American Music, 17 (1999), pp. 129-145. 
 
2
 Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought, and Art (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2009), p. 
xii. 
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, many artists felt the need to explore the 
interrelations between the various branches of art and philosophy, as a means of 
achieving aesthetic unity and artistic utopianism,
3
 and we can use Rudhyar as a prime 
example of such a composer. In particular, he frequently acknowledged the influence of 
the ideas of the French philosopher Henri Bergson on his works. In this thesis I examine 
the influence of Bergsonian philosophy in the music and musical aesthetics of Dane 
Rudhyar. While most studies dealing with the music of Rudhyar acknowledge his early 
interest in the philosophies of Bergson (1859-1941), the extent of their influence on his 
musical writings and musical style have been largely underrated. The writings of Bergson 
comprise some of the earliest exposure to modern philosophical thought for the 
composer: Rudhyar began philosophy classes in Paris at the Sorbonne in 1910, where he 
was introduced to the ideas and writings of Bergson, and subsequently expressed great 
enthusiasm for them. The connection between Rudhyar and Bergson is significant, since 
it can be considered the starting point for the composer‟s later exploration of mysticism, 
since Bergson was credited with bringing modern philosophy out of the highly scientific 
and positivistic domain of August Comte and back into the realm of metaphysics. This 
facet of Bergson‟s influence was recognized by many, including the Pragmatist Harvard 
philosopher William James, who described Bergson as a “Magician.” 
 Although Rudhyar became highly involved with esoteric thought shortly after his 
arrival in America in 1916, Bergsonian concepts continued to permeate Rudhyar‟s 
aesthetic writings on the mystical power of the arts throughout his life. This is not 
surprising, since Rudhyar placed much emphasis on the spiritual unification of all 
humankind, stating “But it is all one philosophy. It is one way of thinking of life. My 
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 Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought, and Art, p. 1. 
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thinking process—and I must say, even my feeling process—are very different from 
those of almost anybody I know. I mean, in that sense, my life has been absolutely 
lonely…”4 Thus, Bergson‟s influence on the aesthetics of the composer, both during the 
early and later parts of his life, should not be underestimated. 
 The study of Bergsonian influence with regard to Rudhyar acquires even greater 
significance when dealing with aspects of musical style. In particular, concepts discussed 
in Bergson‟s book Évolution créatrice (Creative Evolution, 1907), can be seen at work in 
Rudhyar‟s music. When analyzed using the Bergsonian concepts of intellect, intuition, 
duration, élan vital, Becoming (or creative evolution), Rudhyar‟s music begins to yield 
interesting and fascinating results, and particular aspects of his musical style come to the 
forefront. In addition, a certain metaphysical meaning begins to emerge. This, I think, is 
imperative to understanding Rudhyar as an artist, philosopher and mystic and evaluating 
his role in American culture. 
 In Chapter 1 I provide an overview of the Parisian intellectual and cultural climate 
in which both Bergson and Rudhyar were immersed. I deal with the highly important idea 
of magic, both practical and metaphorical, and I discuss the reasons why Bergson would 
have been so influential in France, and contextualizes Bergson‟s popularity in America. 
In Chapter 2 I discuss Bergson‟s philosophical concepts and compares them to those 
presented in Rudhyar‟s writings. In Chapter 3 I analyze Rudhyar‟s works, by applying 
Bergsonian philosophical concepts of duration, élan vital, and creative evolution. In 
particular, I demonstrates how Rudhyar‟s use of motivic alterations, his fluid rhythmic 
and metric style, and his use of registral space contribute to creating a piece which 
simultaneously represents differing metaphysical levels and still consists of a unified 
                                                 
4
 See Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought, and Art, p. 1. 
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whole. In addition, I discuss the musical correspondences between Copland‟s Piano 
Variations and Rudhyar‟s Granites and Three Paeans, and I analyze these two pieces 
with respect to the differing aesthetics of the two composers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Dane Rudhyar and Henri Bergson in the Context of Magic 
 
 
What is Magic? The word has become the synonym of fraud and 
charlatanism; and this is most unfortunate, because it was an excellent word 
which expressed perfectly well etymologically and otherwise an idea which 
the world needs intensely today. 
 
       —Dane Rudhyar,  
       Art as the Release of Power
5
 
 
 
 For those who have looked into the biography of Dane Rudhyar, it will come as 
no surprise to learn about his fascination and involvement with the concept of magic 
and the occult, as well as world religions and philosophies. Dane Rudhyar was born in 
Paris in 1895 as Daniel Chennevière during a time when the city could be characterized 
as the locus of modernity,
6
 and although modernists and mystics might “make an 
incongruous combination,”7 a closer look at some of the figures associated with 
modernism reveals fascinating connections with magic and mysticism. In fact, those 
associated with modernist thought attempted to join ancient forms of faith and 
mysticism to modern thought—they not only looked forward in terms of critical history 
and philosophy, but they also looked back into the history of mystical traditions. 
                                                 
5
 Dane Rudhyar, Art as a Release of Power (Whitefish: Kessinger, 2008), p. 5. 
 
6
 The young Daniel Chennevière changed his name in 1918 to Rudhyar, which was taken from the Sanskrit 
word rudha, which was symbolic of a rebirth. This is particularly important with reference to his metaphor 
of the decay and the seed. See Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought, and Art, p. 13. 
 
7
 William L. Portier and C.J.T. Talar, “The Mystical Element of the Modernist Crisis,” in Modernists & 
Mystics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009), p. 1. 
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In his book Art as Release of Power, Rudhyar defines “Magic” as “the release of 
power through an efficient form by an act of will. It is in fact life itself; but life in terms 
of human characteristics, destiny and will-power….Magic, thus understood, differs from 
age to age according to the focalization of the Race‟s will and desire.”8 Thus, for 
Rudhyar, magic is the resultant force produced, and this force is produced because the 
human will sees a need to create it. Consequently, “Paris in 1900 was not at the end of a 
century. It was at the beginning of one,” 9 and this led many to believe that a modern 
society such as Paris was ripe for change. One way to achieve this was through the 
exploration of non-Western cultures and mysticism. Consequently, although Rudhyar 
grew up and was educated in a city that had provided a stage for the invention of modern 
poetry and literature and visual and performing arts, as well as cutting-edge scientific 
advancements, he also belonged to a culture which was interested and valued non-
Western cultures. This interest in Orientalism and exoticism was fostered by the enduring 
belief that the “primitive” non-Western cultures could play a part in the revitalization of 
the overly modern Western world.
10
 Thus, for a young artist such as Rudhyar, Paris 
provided the perfect place to experience the rise of a modern, multi-cultural world, as 
well as develop a deep appreciation for what the religious beliefs and philosophies of 
non-Western cultures could teach him. 
                                                 
8
 Rudhyar, Art as the Release of Power, p. 5. Italics are in the original. Here, Rudhyar uses the term “Race” 
in the sense that Helena Blavatsky had used it in The Secret Doctrine. It was not really a classification of 
human beings as it refered to levels of human evolution. 
 
9
 William R. Everdell, The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of Twentieth-Century Thought (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 142. 
 
10
 For studies which deal in whole or in part with issues of Orientalism and exoticism, see Annegret Fauser, 
Musical Encounters at the 1889 Paris World Fair (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2005), pp. 
139-215, and Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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Within the booming multi-cultural Parisian scene were numerous groups which 
associated themselves with forms of mysticism. These usually included a wide array of 
artists such as poets, musicians and painters. A well-known example would be the 
French composer, organist, and teacher, Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992). Although he 
belonged to a slightly later decade than turn of the century artists, he nonetheless 
transferred his fervent Catholic mysticism to his music.
11
 He was also one of several 
composers to value non-European cultures, especially Indian and Japanese, and he 
tended to direct his theological focus towards themes of glory, mystery, and miracles—
much like the significant themes of some of the ancient religions and philosophies 
which had attracted the attention of so many. Seen in this broader context, it is evident 
that Messiaen‟s work belonged to a much wider circle of mystical aesthetics. 
Several other artists in addition to Messiaen and Rudhyar concerned themselves 
with forms of mysticism. Mysticism, in this context, refers to the constellation of 
distinctive practices, discourses, texts, institutions, traditions, and experiences aimed at 
human transformation.
12
 Many of these mystics expressed an interest in occult 
phenomena, which we can define as hidden knowledge or wisdom.
13
 For example, a 
large number of these artists gathered themselves at the popular avant-garde and occult 
                                                 
11
 Although several artists looked  towards other forms of mysticism than Catholicism, modern 
historiography on the subject of Catholicism in France suggests a very narrow notion of what this religion 
may have meant to French artists. For example, in his entry on Messiaen, Paul Griffiths states that the 
composer was “alone in his joyously held Catholic faith, which again was unswerving.” As a matter of 
course, many artists such as Poulenc, Satie (in his unique way), the Schola cantorum composers, and the 
visual artist Matisse maintained some kind of tie with Catholicism. Such generalized assessments go 
against the kind of historiography for which I am arguing here. See Paul Griffiths, “Messiaen, Olivier,” 
Grove Music Online, accessed 13 June 2010. 
 
12
 Jerome Gellman, “Mysticism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online,accessed July 19 
2010. 
 
13
 Sven Ove Hansson, “Science and Pseudo-Science,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, 
accessed 19 July 2010.  
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bookshop and publishing house, L’Art indépendent, which Edmond Bailly opened in 
1885 in downtown Paris. Bailly, himself an amateur composer, had become a 
Theosophist when Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891) brought her Secret Doctrine to 
France in the 1880s.
14
 According to Balvatsky, the “West had fallen into a state of 
decline and ignorance. She argued that the East preserved all of its ancient wisdom, and 
thus, it was for humans, who possessed both an historical and scientific knowledge, to 
give it a new impulse.”15 The introduction of Theosophy into France at this time was 
quite significant in that it relied essentially on Eastern philosophy for its doctrine, and it 
eventually became one of the most important esoteric movements in Europe and 
America, influencing artists such as Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944), Alexander 
Scriabin (1872-1915), Henry Cowell (1897-1965), and Dane Rudhyar, among others. 
Consequently, L’Art independent “attracted occultists, esthetes, symbolists, decadents, 
esotericists and avant-garde artistic thought.”16  
Although we currently know very little about Bailly‟s bookshop, it is definitely 
an organization which should be explored further in order to study the influence of 
occultism on twentieth-century French culture, since we can make connections between 
L’Art indépendent and several very important twentieth-century figures. For example, 
some might be surprised to discover that Claude Debussy (1862-1918) and Erik Satie 
(1866-1925) were daily visitors to the bookshop, and that on an illustrated cover of one 
of Bailly‟s compositions entitled La Tristesse d’Ulad is a watercolor signed by “M. 
                                                 
14
 Jocelyn Godin, Music and the Occult: French Musical Philosophies, 1750-1950 (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 1995), p. 152. 
 
15
 Godin, Music and the Occult: French Musical Philosophies, 1750-1950, p. 152. 
 
16
 Godin, Music and the Occult: French Musical Philosophies, 1750-1950, p. 152. 
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Bergson-McGregor [sic]” (this refers to Mina, or Moïna, Bergson-MacGregor (1865-
1928)), who was the sister of Henri Bergson. In the case of Debussy and Satie, scholars 
have dealt extensively with their importance in the history of music as leaders of the 
impressionistic and the avant-garde musical movement, respectively. We can perceive 
the influence of occultism in some of the titles of the works of these two composers, for 
example Satie‟s Gnossiennes, and more specifically, the Première pensée rose + croix 
and the Sonneries de la rose + croix, both of which are named after the symbol of the 
esoteric movement of Rosicrucianism—the theology of a secret society of mystics, said 
to have been founded in late medieval Germany by Christian Rosenkreuz. In fact, 
during the years 1881 and 1882, Satie was the official composer for the French poet 
Joséphin Péladan‟s (1858-1918) spurious Ordre de la Rose-Croix Catholique du 
Temple et du Graal, and because of this, he was permitted to experiment musically at 
Péladan‟s Rosicrucian salons at the fashionable Galerie Durand-Ruel.17 Mina Bergson-
MacGregor, on the other hand, is less known. As mentioned above, she was the sister of 
Henri Bergson, but she was also the wife of the occult novelist and founder of the 
Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mathers (1854-1918). 
She was also a reputed clairvoyant, which no doubt would have made her a popular 
guest at Bailly‟s shop. There is no documentation to confirm that Henri Bergson ever 
set foot inside L’Art indépendent, and although there is no evidence to suggest that he 
was engaged in the occult activities of his sister and her husband, there is a connection 
between his own professional interests and those of this sister. For example, Bergson 
was a member of the British Society for Psychical Research, of which he eventually 
accepted the Presidency in 1913 and delivered an impressive address entitled 
                                                 
17
 Robert Orledge, “Satie, Erik,” in Grove Music Online, accessed 13 June 2010. 
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“Fantômes des vivants et recherche psychique” (“Phantoms of Life and Psychic 
Research”). His sister Mina was also a member of the Society. In addition, his 
philosophical works, which not only attempted to restore the metaphysical aspect of 
philosophy that the discipline had progressively lost since the eighteenth century as a 
result of Comtian positivism, but also dealt extensively with issues of religion, 
morality, and mysticism, at least point to him as a participant in the broader cultural 
interest in spirituality. 
The participants at L’Art indépendent which I discussed above have one further 
claim to interest for the subject of my work, in that they were all major figures in 
Rudhyar‟s development as an artist, philosopher and astrologer. As in the case of Henri 
Bergson, there is no documentation to place Rudhyar inside Bailly‟s bookshop. 
However, given Rudhyar‟s admiration for the two composers and his predilection for 
the occult, as well as his interest in Bergsonian philosophies, it is possible that he 
himself may have been a visitor to the store. Nonetheless, he was no doubt informed 
about the ideas and practices which emanated from L’Art indépendent, and they 
influenced much of his own thoughts on the connection between music and spirituality. 
What may be concluded from the above discussion of magic and the occult is 
that magic (and all matters involving some type of spiritual meaning) was a very 
important element of twentieth-century modernist culture.
18
 In fact, the concept of 
magic went beyond the popular ritualistic occult phenomena that had become the trend 
among some mystical, avant-garde circles. Rudhyar, in this chapter‟s initial quotation, 
                                                 
18
 Several studies have been devoted to the subject of magic in modern culture. For example, see Corinna 
Treitel, A Science for the Soul: Occultism and the Genesis of the German Modern (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2004); Corinna Treitel, “What the Occult Reveals,” Modern Intellectual History, 
6 (2009), pp. 611-625; and C.J.T. Talar, ed., Modernists & Mystics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2009), among others. 
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distinguished between a fraudulent conception of magic and one which referred to 
something on a higher mystical level and of which human society was in great need. 
Rudhyar‟s first distinction was probably synonymous with the popular and trendy 
séances that were happening all over Europe at the time and that more often than 
anything else, provided entertainment for their spectators. His second distinction had 
broader cultural implications, since Rudhyar believed that the decaying occidental 
society in which he found himself could be replenished and reborn through magic. Both 
Rudhyar and Bergson had a connection to this broader definition of magic as a means 
of replenishing society of its devoid morality, and this point of view was also 
theoreticized by the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). 
Max Weber characterized modern Western society as a “disenchanted” world. 
Most disciplines during the early twentieth century were still under the influence of the 
positivism of Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the philosophical system in which the 
sciences take on a centralized focus, with an emphasis on scientific research procedures 
and methodologies. But several thinkers saw the limitations of this system, including 
Max Weber, Henri Bergson and William James, among others. In particular, Weber 
was the first to associate the rise of positivism and modernity with what he called the 
“disenchantment of the world.” Consequently, he also posited that humanity could 
return to a more spiritual state of being by means of “re-enchantment of the world.” 
Weber‟s ideas on the subject give a broader context in which to place Rudhyar‟s own 
observations of the decaying Western society in which he found himself. Weber was an 
economic sociologist—however, he was also a sociologist of religion, and throughout 
12 
 
his academic works, he tried to determine the link between these two areas.
19
 He 
studied in Heidelberg and Berlin, and also held a teaching position at the University of 
Berlin.  
What was highly important about Weber‟s sociological works is that he derived 
his theories from his observations of the distinctive characteristics and rituals of various 
cultures and their religions. Among his books were The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, The Religion of India: 
The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, and Ancient Judaism. His work on other 
religions was interrupted by his sudden death in 1920, which also prevented him from 
following Ancient Judaism with studies of Psalms, the Book of Jacob, Talmudic Jewry, 
early Christianity and Islam.  
According to Weber, disenchantment is literally a process of “de-magification.” 
Fundamental to this process was modern science, which was “singularly responsible for 
this late development, [and] was initially welcomed as a surrogate system of orderly 
value creation….Modern science has relentlessly deconstructed other value-creating 
activities, in the course of which its own meaning has also been demolished beyond 
repair.”20 Thus, modern humanity “no longer submits itself to the spell of superstition and 
the sacred rituals of power, but has demystified its existence through the calculations of 
science and the bureaucratic apparatus of state. What was supernatural has been 
                                                 
19
 To a certain extent, Bergson also linked the so-called „disenchantment of the world‟ and war to socio-
economic factors: he identified the two principal causes as overpopulation and overconsumption. This 
provides an interesting connection to the work of Weber, particularly since Bergson made these 
conclusions in 1932, twelve years after the death of Weber, and it is entirely possible that he was well-
acquainted with the latter‟s publications. 
 
20
 Sung Ho Kim, “Max Weber,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, accessed 6 April 
2010. 
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rationalized as merely natural, the authority of religion has been replaced by the politics 
of state. The modernization of society is therefore its secularization.”21 
 Although Weber discussed his ideas of disenchantment and re-enchantment of the 
world in the context of economics, arguing that de-magification was linked with 
modernity and the rise of capitalism, we can easily see similar traits in areas outside of 
economics. Indeed, it seems that the broader culture of the time perceived this trend 
towards disenchantment and a need for a new beginning. Rudhyar himself often 
compared Western society at large to a seed in a decaying fruit, stating that “the cultural 
and moral decay in which he found himself prompted him toward some kind of 
emancipation from the norms, clichés, and even the morality of European culture, which 
were weighing heavily upon his shoulders.”22 The metaphors of decay and of the seed 
were symbolic, embodying notions of sacrifice, death, rebirth, potentiality, direction, and 
expectation, among other things, that were brought about by unstable and unsatisfactory 
social factors in Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Thus, he 
saw the disenchantment of the world not as an end, but rather as an opportunity for 
humanity to revitalize itself, just as a seed from a decaying fruit still has the potential to 
grow into a wholesome fruit. Furthermore, Rudhyar believed that the time for the “re-
enchantment of the world” had come, declaring that “the disintegration of the old 
European culture and music is still going on, both in Vienna and in Paris. But seeds have 
escaped from the decaying fruit.”23 
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 Daniel K.L. Chua, “Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature,” in Music Theory and 
Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century, ed. by Susannah Clark and Alexander 
Rehding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 20. 
 
22
 Deniz Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought and Art, p. 10. 
 
23
 Ertan, Dane Rudhyar: His Music, Thought and Art, p. 13. 
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 Rudhyar‟s preoccupation with matters of spiritual and moral rebirth and 
replenishment of humanity is obvious from his book titles, which include The 
Rediscovery of Music, The Rebirth of Hindu Music, Liberation through Sound, Art as 
Release of Power, and The Magic of Tone, among others. Also evident in some of his 
book titles is the importance of magic, and the connection between magic and the arts, 
especially music. As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, for Rudhyar, magic is the 
resultant force produced, and this force is produced because the will sees a need to create 
it. Rudhyar‟s definition of magic was largely influenced by Bergson‟s philosophical ideas 
about evolution, which he crystallized in his book L’Évolution créatrice of 1907. 
Notably, Bergson believed that change, and consequently creation, was a continual 
process spurred by an élan vital, or a vital force. The confluence of Bergson‟s concept of 
creative evolution and the élan vital and Rudhyar‟s definition of magic not only not only 
results in an interesting connection of ideas between the two figures, but it also reinforces 
the notion that magic had broader cultural implications than simply occult connotations, 
and that Bergson was highly respected within this paradigm. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by a section of a congratulatory letter that the American pragmatist 
philosopher William James sent to Bergson upon the publication of the latter‟s book, 
Évolution créatrice: 
 
Oh, my Bergson, you are a magician and your book is a marvel, a real 
wonder….But, unlike the works of genius of the Transcendentalist 
movement (which are so obscurely and abominably and inaccessibly 
written), a pure classic point of form….such a flavor of persistent euphony, 
as of a rich river that never foamed or ran thin, but steadily and firmly 
proceeded with its bands full to the brim. The aptness of your illustrations, 
that never scratch or stand out at right angles, but invariably simplify the 
thought and help to pour it along. Oh, indeed you are a magician! And if 
15 
 
your next book proves to be as great an advance on this one as this is on its 
predecessors, your name will surely go down as one of the great creative 
names in philosophy.”24 
 
Thus, James‟s use of the metaphor of the magician in his letter is significant in the 
broader context of magic as discussed above, since through this metaphor James 
implies that the discipline of philosophy was in great need of a change, and that 
Bergson was able to provide this through his writings. In fact, James‟s statement 
that Bergson‟s “name will surely go down as one of the great creative names in 
philosophy” is important since it links creativity, for Bergson, Rudhyar and many 
others, with magic. In short, James credited Bergson with having re-introduced 
the metaphysical back into the discipline of philosophy. And although James does 
not articulate this, we can interpret this passage as meaning that Bergson took a 
step towards the re-enchantment of society. 
 The aim of Bergson‟s philosophical work is situated directly within the context 
of Weber‟s theories about the disenchantment and re-enchantment of the world, and 
this is further confirmed by Bergson‟s own background as a scholar. Many of Weber‟s 
ideas rested on his observations about Western society and its tendency to rationalize 
all aspects of life and use science as the sole approach for investigation. In the words of 
Bergson, “the human intellect feels at home among inanimate objects, more especially 
among solids, where our action finds its fulcrum and our industry its tools; that our 
concepts have been formed on the model of solids; that our logic is, pre-eminently, the 
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 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (London: MacMillan and Co., Limited, 
1920), pp. ix-x. 
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logic of solids; that, consequently, our intellect triumphs in geometry, wherein is 
revealed the kinship of logical thought with unorganized matter.”25 
Bergson himself began as a mathematician and was highly influenced, both from 
an academic as well as a personal standpoint, by the theories of Charles Darwin on 
evolution, especially his best-known work, On the Origin of the Species, which 
appeared in 1859.
26
 Bergson then read the evolutionary theories of the English 
sociologist Herbert Spencer as a student at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. 
Spencer became highly influential for him, but Bergson soon came to realize the 
limitations of Spencer‟s theories of social evolution since they were too largely based 
on scientific methodologies and did not account for continually changing living 
organisms. Spencer‟s theories, therefore, were only appropriate for static, inert matter. 
Therefore, one of Bergson‟s philosophical goals, which is best shown in his book 
L’Évolution créatrice, was to develop a theory in which he would simultaneously 
employ scientific methodologies, accommodate living beings, and confront the 
metaphysical aspect of evolution.  
Eventually, Bergson rejected the use of scientific methodologies in philosophy. In 
his address at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy in Bologna, Italy in 
1911, he insisted that: 
 
[T]he future of philosophy lay in pursuing a method quite different 
from that of science. Traditionally, the philosopher had followed the 
route of scientific analysis and had constructed systematic intellectual 
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representations of the world. Such rational structures are destined to 
failure or diminishment, he claimed, because as scientific inquiry 
penetrates into the same field explored by the philosopher the discrete 
and verifiable findings of the scientist overthrow or displace 
philosophical system. The future of the philosopher belongs not to 
intellectual analysis but to intuitional knowledge, “akin to that of the 
artist, and differing fundamentally from the kind of activity you get in 
science.”27 
 
Bergson‟s emphasis on intuition is even more important if we place it in the early 
twentieth-century context of the increased significance of magic as the conscious 
manipulation of various conceptual practices to achieve the desired result. Many 
scholars and artists, both past and present, have considered magic to represent the point 
of intersection between religion and science.
28
 In fact, it is sometimes difficult to 
establish the border between magic and science, enough so that at times, the only 
distinctions rest with who is practicing what: magic tends to belong in the realm of 
popular culture, while most would consider science as the domain of the 
„intellectuals.‟29 Consequently, several participants of magic used this vague distinction 
in order to justify their practices as being legitimate scientific research, especially 
within a still largely positivistic environment. Thus, twentieth-century alchemists also 
proclaimed themselves chemists, hypnotists proclaimed themselves also psychologists, 
and so on.  
Bergson‟s attempt at achieving a philosophy that was both scientific and 
metaphysical also plays within the paradigm of magic as a mixture of science and 
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religion. We can observe this not only in his three most famous works, Essai sur les 
données immédiates de la conscience (Time and Free Will) from 1889, Matière et 
mémoire (Matter and Memory) from 1896, and L’Évolution créatrice, but most notably 
in a fourth later very popular work which Bergson wrote in 1932 entitled Les deux 
sources de la morale et de la religion (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion). The 
two sources that Bergson identified were social instinct and mystical intuition: 
 
Central to Bergson‟s thesis was the idea that mystics could transcend 
their historical and social context and then, based on this transcendent 
experience, introduce a dynamic element into an otherwise static 
religion.
30
 
 
 
Therefore, Bergson the philosopher had an explicit interest in mysticism, which is 
an idea essential to magic, and all of his works led him to the conclusion that the only 
way to “re-enchant” the world was through it. Of course, this tenet was bound to be 
attractive to a composer such as Rudhyar, and although he was introduced to Bergson‟s 
ideas at a young age in France, their influence on his own work continued throughout 
his life, including after Rudhyar‟s move to America in 1916. By that time, Bergson was 
already a popular philosopher in the United States, mainly with the aid of William 
James and other artists such as Edgard Varèse who arrived in New York in 1914. 
Furthermore, Bergson paid a visit in 1913. The details about his visit demonstrate 
exactly how popular he was:  
 
In 1913, when Bergson traveled to New York to receive an honorary degree 
from Columbia University and to deliver a series of lectures, automobiles 
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bound for the lecture hall crowded along Broadway (surely one of the first 
traffic jams in America), and inside well-dressed auditors jostled one 
another aside to find a seat.
31
  
  
 
Bergson‟s popularity in America makes the connection between him and Rudhyar even 
stronger, since when the young composer arrived, he was in an intellectual environment 
in which his exploration of Bergson‟s ideas were not only accepted, but favorable. To 
these, Rudhyar could thus expand his knowledge with ideas from various Eastern 
religions and philosophies.  
 In conclusion, in this chapter, I have dealt with the cultural implications of magic. 
The early twentieth century, both in Europe and in America, was one of excitement, but 
also of contradictions. Although scientific advancements continued, there was a reaction 
against positivism and an acknowledged need for a more metaphysical and mystical 
world view. This was provided by several artists and intellectuals who looked to magic, 
and in particular to mysticism, as a means of achieving this ideal world. However, magic 
had greater connotations than simply the occult: magic was a way of bringing humanity 
back to the moral sense that spiritualism can pro ide; and Bergson took on that challenge 
by discussing philosophy in a way that included the metaphysical and was in line with 
most definitions of magic. Because of this, he was also very influential to Rudhyar, who 
used his ideas as a basis for his philosophy of the arts, including music, and who 
employed them also in a more practical way in his musical compositions. The next 
chapter will explore in detail the connection between Bergson‟s and Rudhyar‟s ideas.  
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Chapter 2: Bergson and Rudhyar: Some Definitions of Concepts 
  
 
 Bergson‟s ideas about evolution were paramount for Rudhyar‟s ideas about art 
and music. Although we can see most of the concepts which Bergson discusses in 
Creative Evolution already hinted at in his three other well-known philosophical works 
Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory (where the ideas are developed to a lesser 
degree) and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (where certain ideas are 
developed for a different purpose), it is in Creative Evolution that these concepts are most 
clearly laid out and make their most forceful appearance. The main goal of Bergson‟s 
Creative Evolution was to tackle the problem of evolution from a philosophical point of 
view. As Leszek Kolakowski has stated, “[I]ts philosophical importance lay in the fact 
that it was the boldest attempt to assimilate the theory of evolution to a world view which 
implied a Great Mind at the steering wheel of the universe and the absolute irreducibility 
of the human soul to its material conditions.”32 In particular, Bergson devoted much 
effort to countering the theories of Herbert Spencer, who had gone one step further than 
Darwin to devise a theory of sociological evolution, as may be seen in his Principles of 
Biology of 1864.
33
 As a young researcher, Bergson had been quite enamored not only of 
the conclusions of Spencer, but also of his rigorous scientific methodology to describe the 
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process of evolution. Bergson devoted the fourth chapter of Creative Evolution to a 
critique of prior philosophical systems dealing with the question of Becoming (or 
evolution)
34
 by historical figures such as Aristotle, Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant and 
Spencer, as well as a critique of the approaches of ancient and modern science. He 
described the significance of Spencer thus: 
 
That the thought of the nineteenth century called for a philosophy of this 
kind, rescued from the arbitrary, capable of coming down to the detail of 
particular facts, is unquestionable. Unquestionably, also, it felt that this 
philosophy ought to establish itself in what we call concrete duration. The 
advent of the moral sciences, the progress of psychology, the growing 
importance of embryology among the biological sciences—all this was 
bound to suggest the idea of a reality which endures inwardly, which is 
duration itself. So, when a philosopher arose who announced a doctrine of 
evolution, in which the progress of matter toward perceptibility would be 
traced together with the advance of the mind toward rationality, in which the 
complication of correspondences between the external and the internal 
would be followed step by step, in which change would become the very 
substance of things—to him all eyes were turned. The powerful attraction 
that Spencerian evolutionism has exercised on contemporary thought is due 
to that very cause. However far Spencer may seem to be from Kant, 
however ignorant, indeed, he may have been of Kantianism, he felt, 
nevertheless, at his first contact with the biological sciences, the direction in 
which philosophy could continue to advance without laying itself open to 
the Kantian criticism.
35
 
 
 
Therefore, Bergson credits Spencer with introducing to philosophy the new discoveries 
and approaches of the biological sciences, psychology, and the moral sciences, which 
consisted of the social sciences and humanities such as history, sociology, anthropology, 
and economics, among others. The French philosopher‟s research on evolution, which 
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culminated in Creative Evolution, was initially meant to be a direct extension of 
Spencer‟s work. 
 However, Bergson soon realized that Spencer‟s conclusions were unsatisfactory. 
As he stated in his critique of Spencerian evolutionism:  
 
But he had no sooner started to follow the path than he turned off short. He 
had promised to retrace a genesis, and, lo! he was doing something entirely 
different. His doctrine bore indeed the name of evolutionism; it claimed to 
remount and redescend the course of the universal becoming; but, in fact, it 
dealt neither with becoming nor with evolution. 
 
We need not enter here into a profound examination of this philosophy. Let 
us say merely that the usual device of the Spencerian method consists in 
reconstructing evolution with fragments of the evolved.
36
 
 
 
 
Therefore, although Bergson respected Spencer‟s theories and methodologies, he 
acknowledged that the notion of a fragmentary evolution which emerged from them did 
could never adequately describe the evolutionary process. 
Bergson‟s main criticism of Spencer was that the latter‟s theories of evolution were 
better applicable to inert matter than to living organisms. Indeed, one of Bergson‟s main 
criticisms of the human mind was that it best comprehended inert matter: 
 
We shall see that the human intellect feels at home among inanimate 
objects, more especially among solids, where our action finds its fulcrum 
and our industry its tools; that our concepts have been formed on the model 
of solids; that our logic is, pre-eminently, the logic of solids; that, 
consequently, our intellect triumphs in geometry, wherein is revealed the 
kinship of logical thought with unorganized matter, and where the intellect 
has only to follow its natural movement, after the lightest possible contact 
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with experience, in order to go from discovery to discovery, sure that 
experience is following behind it and will justify it invariably.
37
 
 
 
He compared Spencer‟s „illusion‟ to a picture that is cut up into several pieces: the 
fragments may be placed together again to reproduce the image, but it is not the same act 
as the initial act of creating the drawing or painting. Thus,  
 
[B]y combining together the most simple results of evolution, you may 
imitate well or ill the most complex effects; but of neither the simple nor the 
complex will you have retraced the genesis, and the addition of evolved to 
evolved will bear no resemblance whatever to the movement of evolution.
38
  
 
 
 
In addition,  
 
He [Spencer] takes reality in its present form; he breaks it into pieces, he 
scatters it in fragments which he throws to the winds; then he “integrates” 
these fragments and “dissipates their movement.” Having imitated the 
Whole by a work of mosaic, he imagines he has retraced the design of it, 
and made the genesis. 
 
Is it matter that is in question? The diffused elements which he integrates 
into visible and tangible bodies have all the air of being the very particles of 
the simple bodies, which he first supposes disseminated throughout space. 
They are, at any rate, “material points,” and consequently unvarying points, 
veritable little solids: as if solidity, being what is nearest and handiest to us, 
could be found at the very origin of materiality!
39
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Thus, Bergson did not believe that Spencer‟s conception of evolution as blocks of 
progress and change was an adequate representation of the process of Becoming for 
living organisms. He explained the main problem of the study of evolution in the opening 
chapter to Creative Evolution: 
 
But from this it must follow that our thought, in its purely logical form, is 
incapable of presenting the true nature of life, the full meaning of the 
evolutionary movement. Created by life, in definite circumstances, to act on 
definite things, how can it embrace life, of which it is only an emanation or 
an aspect? Deposited by the evolutionary movement in the course of its way, 
how can it be applied to the evolutionary movement itself?
40
 
 
 
 
 Bergson goes on to explain the inadequacy of the Spencerian „block‟ conception 
of evolution: 
 
I find, first of all, that I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold, I am 
merry or sad, I work or I do nothing, I look at what is around me, or I think 
of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the 
changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I 
change, then, without ceasing. But this is not saying enough. Change is far 
more radical than we are at first inclined to suppose. 
 
For I speak of each of my states as if it formed a block and were a separate 
whole. I say indeed that I change, but the change seems to me to reside in 
the passage from one state to the next: of each state, taken separately, I am 
apt to think that it remains the same during all the time that it prevails. 
Nevertheless, a slight effort of attention would reveal to me that there is no 
feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every moment: 
if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow.
41
 
 
 
 
 Bergson then provides a more concrete example: 
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Let us take the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a 
motionless external object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it 
from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the 
vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had, even if only 
because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, 
which conveys something of the past into the present. My mental state, as it 
advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration 
which it accumulates: it goes on increasing—rolling upon itself, as a 
snowball on the snow. Still more is this the case with states more deeply 
internal, such as sensations, feelings, desires, etc., which do not correspond, 
like a simple visual perception, to an unvarying external object. But it is 
expedient to disregard this uninterrupted change, and to notice it only when 
it becomes sufficient to impress a new attitude on the body, a new direction 
on the attention. Then, and then only, we find that our state has changed. 
The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is 
nothing but change. 
 
This amounts to saying that there is no essential difference between passing 
from one state to another and persisting in the same state. If the state which 
“remains the same” is more varied than we think, on the other hand the 
passing from one state to another resembles, more than we imagine, a single 
state being prolonged; the transition is continuous.
42
 
 
 
 
Consequently, according to Bergson, when we perceive change, it is because the change 
is major enough to be perceived as a change of state. However, the reality of evolution is 
that changes of state are continuous, and therefore, evolution cannot be thought of as a 
series of blocks or fragments such as Spencer conceived it. And a continuous evolution—
a creative evolution—depended upon several factors. These will now be discussed. 
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Intellect and Intuition: 
 
 
 By contrast with most other philosophers and because of some of his own work in 
the realms of psychology and biology, Bergson focused on the workings of the human 
mind in understanding the process of evolution. One of the most important observations 
that he made in this regard was the difference between human intelligence and instinct. 
According to Bergson, the normal way our intelligence works is guided by needs. 
Consequently, the knowledge it gathers is not disinterested—it is relative knowledge.43 
Intelligence gathers knowledge through analysis, which Bergson defines as the act of 
dividing things according to specific perspectives taken. Comprehensive analytic 
knowledge then consists in the reconstruction or re-composition of a thing by means of 
synthesizing the perspectives, and “this synthesis, while helping us satisfy needs, never 
gives us the thing itself—it only gives us a general concept of things.”44  As Kolakowski 
has stated, “Our intelligence is at home among solid bodies and is designed to deal with 
them efficiently. It is therefore naturally prone to investigate the phenomena of life in the 
same way that it studies inert matter. The specificity of life eludes it, whereas instinct 
grasps life itself directly, but is unable to search for it and to express what it „knows.‟”45 
 Intuition consists of entering into the thing, rather than going around it from the 
outside, thus giving absolute knowledge. However, intuition also requires intellectual 
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effort,
46
 and when instinctive knowledge is combined with the synthesizing knowledge of 
the intellect, the result is complete knowledge of something. In the words of Bergson, 
 
Indeed, if the fringe [between intellect and intuition] exists, however 
delicate and indistinct, it should have more importance for philosophy than 
the bright nucleus it surrounds. For it is its presence that enables us to affirm 
that the nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a contradiction, by 
condensation, of a more extensive power. And, just because this vague 
intuition is of no help in directing our action on things, which action takes 
place exclusively on the surface of reality, we may presume that it is to be 
exercised not merely on the surface, but below.
47
 
 
Furthermore, Bergson considers intuition a reversal of habitual intelligence—where 
human experience becomes concerned with utility and becomes an essential effort. Thus, 
“[i]ntelligence and instinct are two different organs which nature produced to enable 
living creatures to cope with their environment, both organic and inorganic.”48  
 The distinction between intellect and intuition is fundamental for Bergson‟s 
concept of creative evolution. It affects the understanding of several other key concepts 
from his theories, such as time, space, duration, and the élan vital. In a similar manner, 
Rudhyar also distinguishes between intelligence and intuition (although he does not call it 
intuition per se), in particular in his philosophical work Art as Release of Power. 
According to Rudhyar: 
 
At present the race, or rather the elite of the human race, is more and more 
polarized in the mind. There is its point of emphasis. Its desires are, if not 
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very intellectual or mental as yet, still strongly dominated by intellectual 
concepts and reactions. Human will has thus become mentalized, 
individualized; and as a result divorced from purely physical-biological 
nature with which it does not want any longer to commune, but which it 
essentially wants to master. The two italicized terms mark the difference, a 
difference of will, of emotional reaction and purpose.
49
 
 
 
Therefore, Rudhyar implies, along the same lines as Bergson, that the intellect does not 
provide complete knowledge of a thing—it is external, rather than internal, knowledge. In 
fact, Rudhyar goes so far as to say that it results in an individualized state of mind, and 
not a communal state of mind.  
 A communal sense of identity was an important notion for Rudhyar and it led to a 
universal sense of morality. It was also a fundamental notion for Bergson, who was 
convinced that in order to insure the survival of the human species, modern people 
needed some sort of universal religion that could help them live together without killing 
each other, since most modernists after the turn of the century became aware of the 
potential humans had for mutual destruction, and the role that religion played in it.
50
 
Also, a universal religion was seen as essential for a universal sense of morality because 
it would allow for the re-enchantment of the world through its potential for mystical 
experience. He eventually identified social instinct and mystical intuition as the two 
sources of morality and religion. Furthermore, he emphasized religious experience as an 
essential component to the universal religion that would save humanity, for Bergson 
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argued that “mystics could transcend their historical and social context and then, based on 
this transcendent experience, introduce a dynamic element into an otherwise static 
religion.”51 Consequently, while intellect was an asset, instinct and intuition were still the 
most fundamental qualities for a complete understanding of life.  
 Rudhyar‟s philosophical and spiritual beliefs also relied on intuition rather than 
intelligence, but he extended his thoughts to music. As Judith Tick has stated, “[l]ike 
early French modernists, Rudhyar attacked Western musical practice as decadent and 
overintellectualized, rejecting the traditional structural forms of tonality and the 
techniques of counterpoint as rationalistic rather than intuitive.”52 In addition, Rudhyar 
argued for an intuitive compositional process, which, in music, he linked to the mystic 
mood of a tone—Rudhyar‟s theory of the symbolic content of the single tone, a concept 
which he took from non-Western music and in which the “mystic moment is linked to the 
value of spontaneity or unpredictability.”53 Rudhyar further expanded and developed 
these ideas to fit a broader philosophical system, and they bear the stamp of Bergson‟s 
own thoughts. For example, Rudhyar combines the intellect with analytic knowledge 
(Rudhyar talks about energy here), while the intuitive knowledge is linked with internal, 
instinctive states: 
 
This new type of energy assumed by mental man requires a new technique of 
performance. This technique is based essentially upon the intellectual method developed 
by mathematical studies. It rests upon intellectual abstract formulas, just as the old 
magical technique of the sanctuaries rested upon the handling of certain magnetic forces 
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of a biological physiological nature by means of the training and development of an 
aspect of the human will. Now the mathematician or electrical engineer needs relatively 
little development of his will. What is developed is his abstract mind…The two methods 
lead to the development of two different faculties…Through them two different types of 
Energy are assumed, two different kinds of forms-of-power are built through which two 
different modes of power will be released.
54
 
 
 
 
It is clear that both Bergson and Rudhyar distinguished between intellectual and intuitive 
forms of knowledge or energy, and that these two different modes were essential for a 
complete understanding of the state of being. 
 
 
 
Space, Time and Duration: 
 
 One of the major concerns for Bergson was the study of time and change. In fact, 
early in his career, he devoted an entire book, Time and Free Will, to the question of time 
and how change plays into it. Furthermore, the issue continues to play a central role in his 
later works, notably Creative evolution. As Mark Muldoon has remarked, “Bergson was 
the first thinker to seriously challenge the scope of science and give an acceptable 
summation of what science cannot do, namely, deal properly with change and time.”55 
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 According to Bergson, time as it is commonly described is in reality space that 
has been mischaracterized.
56
 This was derived from the Spencerian notion of time, which 
itself was an offshoot of the Newtonian notion of time: the result of Spencer‟s 
conclusions was that  
 
Newtonian time was assumed to be mental time; that human mental 
apprehension of time was only knowable through sequence and the 
succession of mental states. In other words, mental relations constituting our 
ideas of time are the result of inner relations, by perpetual repetition, being 
organized into correspondence with outer relations.
57
 
 
 
 
Thus, Bergson‟s main goal was to show that space and time, as it was usually conceived, 
could not be juxtaposed, for space was static and time was change. The problem with 
Spencer‟s mechanical approach to time was that precisely the fact that he equated it more 
with space than with change, and this view resembles his notion of evolution as a 
fragmentary process, for space per se is infinitely divisible, and we can perceive an object 
or a living being as moving along a trajectory consisting of a collection of fragments 
which can vary in size, thereby rendering the state immobile.
58
 Thus, the “confusion 
[that] lies at the bottom of our abstract concept of time” consists “in reducing a single, 
indivisible quality to a number of units in a homogeneous entity such as space, or a series 
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of numbers.”59 Furthermore, this homogeneous, spatial representation of time is symbolic 
of the real duration (durée), and not the duration itself, which has no parts or segments 
external to each other. No separation of this kind can be established between the present 
and previous states. In other words, 
 
Once the habits of spatialization and visualization were no longer regarded 
as legitimate ways to describe the activity of consciousness, Bergson argued 
that the real sustenance of consciousness could then be grasped—namely 
duration (durée).
60
 
 
 
Thus, we perceive real duration when we concentrate on our internal experience only, 
leaving the external world behind—that is, when we use our intuitive knowledge, rather 
than our intelligence. And when we experience time as duration in a non-spatializable 
way, the future completion of any action, as well as its ramifications, is unforeseeable. In 
the words of Bergson himself: 
 
That is why again they agree in doing away with time. Real duration is that 
duration which gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth. If 
everything is in time, everything changes inwardly, and the same concrete 
reality never recurs. Repetition is therefore possible only in the abstract: 
what is repeated is some aspect that our senses, and especially our intellect, 
have singled out from reality, just because our action, upon which all the 
effort of our intellect is directed, can move only among repetitions. Thus, 
concentrated on that which repeats, solely preoccupied in welding the same 
to the same, intellect turns away from the vision of time. It dislikes what is 
fluid, and solidifies everything it touches. We do not think real time. But we 
live it, because life transcends intellect. The feeling we have of our 
evolution and of the evolution the intellectual concept properly so-called an 
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indistinct fringe that fades off into darkness. Mechanisms and finalism agree 
in taking account only of the bright nucleus shining in the centre. They 
forget that this nucleus has been formed out of the rest by condensation, and 
that the whole must be used, the fluid as well as and more than the 
condensed, in order to grasp the inner movement of life.
61
 
 
 
 
This rests at the heart of Bergson‟s conclusions on creative evolution. As a result, 
evolution, which is always creative, is intimately connected to time as duration, 
because time as duration is real, constantly flowing, unidirectional, and thus non-
repeatable and always changing.
62
 
 
 
Élan vital or Vital Impulse:  
 
 One of Bergson‟s essential concepts of evolution is the élan vital, or vital 
impulse. This is the natural direction-giving tendency which all species, and even 
individuals, possess. The result of the vital impulse is endless struggles for change, 
thereby causing evolution. This tendency is a creative energy because the goal cannot be 
predicted, and always results in something new and different for each species, depending 
on the challenges that the species or individual must face.
63
 Although some of Bergson‟s 
contemporaries and successors criticized and even attacked the concept of the vital 
impulse as a “verbal device lacking any explanatory value…which, as a tool for 
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understanding life, leaves us in exactly the same place that we were without it,”64 it is not 
an empty term, for it implies a kind of intentionality in the evolutionary process. As 
Bergson stated, “each species, each individual even, retains only a certain impetus from 
the universal vital impulsion and tends to use this energy in its own interest.”65  
 While we cannot anticipate the future result of any evolutionary movement, each 
species and individual nonetheless retains part of the whole from which it evolved. Thus 
the whole and the part are intimately connected: 
 
But evolution has actually taken place through millions of individuals, on 
divergent lines, each ending at a crossing from which new paths radiate, and 
so on indefinitely. If our hypothesis is justified, if the essential causes 
working along these diverse roads are of psychological nature, they must 
keep something in common in spite of the divergence of their effects, as 
school-fellows long separated keep the same memories of boyhood. Roads 
may fork or by-ways be opened along which dissociated elements may 
evolve in an independent manner, but nevertheless it is in virtue of the 
primitive impetus of the whole that the movement of the parts continues. 
Something of the whole, therefore, must abide in the parts; and this common 
element will be evident to us in some way, perhaps by the presence of 
identical organs in very different organisms.
66
 
 
 
 Rudhyar also uses the idea of the vital impulse in his writings on art and music. 
For him, human will undergoes struggles and therefore acts by creating an efficient form 
to solve the problem posed. Thus, the human will consists of the vital impulse: 
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Whenever Man, under the stress of a desire, wills to act, he assumes 
power…Having assumed it, he either builds a form-of-power, or else sets 
into operation one which nature has endowed him with, viz. usually his 
body, in parts or as a whole. Having assumed the power, having set the 
form-of-power in operation, release of power follows. The action is per-
formed; which means the will has become act (release of power) through a 
form adapted to the releasing of the special type of power considered and 
assumed.
67
 
 
 
In addition, Rudhyar acknowledges that life consists of a “continuous assumption, 
enforming and performing of power,”68 which is essentially a way of describing 
Bergson‟s theory of creative evolution, and this is something that Rudhyar recognized 
and acknowledges: 
 
All organic bodies have the same function. They differ in form because the 
type of energy they release varies. Evolution can be defined: the continual 
perfecting of a form for the release of a certain type of power which it is the 
Will of the Species to release; which the Genius of the Species (as Bergson 
understands such) has assumed.
69
  
 
 
Thus, Rudhyar calls this process of evolution Magic, since it is the conscious 
manipulation of form as a means of achieving a desired result. As Rudhyar conceived of 
magic, the desired result was the release of energy. Furthermore, his definition implies 
mysticism because it implies the conscious awareness of energy which the “Species” 
needs to release. 
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Chapter 3: Analyses of Rudhyar’s Musical Works in Terms of   
  Bergson’s Philosophical Concepts 
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the most important concepts in Bergson‟s 
philosophical works, and I attempted to show how some of these concepts influenced 
Rudhyar‟s own philosophical thoughts about art and music. In this chapter, I discuss how 
these concepts manifest themselves in Rudhyar‟s musical compositions. Each musical 
work, although exhibiting most of the Bergsonian concepts that I discussed in chapter 2, 
will focus on one aspect. 
 
Granites: An Example of Bergsonian Vital Impulse 
 
 Rudhyar composed Granites in 1929 (but it was published in 1935). In many 
ways, this piece typifies Rudhyar‟s compositional style, mainly in his heavy use of 
dissonances and its very improvisatory manner. Most importantly, like most of Rudhyar‟s 
pieces, he entitled his works after objects or concepts that were thought to contain a 
special form of energy. Thus, by using a pre-existent meaning or form of energy to create 
a new meaning, he believed he was creating an even more efficient form of energy than 
the one with which he had begun, which he did by taking the pre-existent form of granite 
and converting it into a musical medium. 
 There are several reasons why the mineral of granite was attractive to Rudhyar. 
First, mining as well as mineralogy and geology had become important institutions in 
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Europe, notably in France, Germany and England, and although it was very popular as 
both a practical field and a literary phenomenon during the Romantic era, it continued to 
play an significant role in modern culture, for it was not “simply a cold dark hole in the 
ground,” but a mine was a “vital, pulsing place into which man descends as into his own 
soul for the encounter with three dimensions of human experience: history, religion, and 
sexuality.”70 
 In fact, since the late eighteenth century people looked at stones as sources of 
historical information, speaking of lapides literati and “graphic granite” in which the 
history of the ages was recorded. We can see this trend not only in literary works, but 
also in certain scientific documents. For example, Goethe attempted both in his scientific 
writings, which combined poetry with scientific knowledge. And although, “his ideas of 
artistic and natural forms were strongly integrated,”71 they reveal the nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century cultural ideas about the mystical potential of minerals, especially 
granite: 
 
Filled with these thoughts I approach you, the most ancient and worthiest 
monuments of time. As I stand high atop a barren peak and survey the wide 
expanse below, I can say to myself: “Here you stand upon ground which 
reaches right down into the deepest recesses of the Earth, no younger strata, 
no pile of alluvial world. What you tread here is not the perpetual grave of 
those beautiful, fruitful valleys; these peaks have never given birth to a 
living being and have never devoured a living being, for they are before all 
life and above all life.
72
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Consequently, Goethe experienced granite in a mystical way, the mineral having 
almost spiritual or magical powers. 
There was also another aspect about minerals that fascinated both artists and 
scientists: the mysterious generation, or re-generation of stones.
73
 In particular, the 
organic conception of minerals placed them within the Romantic ideal of organicism. 
Additionally, we can see parallels between certain concepts of organicism and Bergson‟s 
ideas on creative evolution. Consequently, it is no coincidence that Rudhyar used a 
mineral as his source of inspiration for Granites. From classical antiquity to the 
eighteenth century people believed that stones and metals grew beneath the earth in the 
same way that organic matter does.
74
 There were three main theories to account for the 
generation of stones in the earth as most other organisms: the Aristotelean theory of 
celestial influences, according to which the rays of celestial bodies penetrate into the 
earth, causing elements to recombine to produce stones; the theory of the “petrific seed,” 
according to which minerals generate themselves in a similar manner to plants; and the 
theory of “lapidifying juice,” according to which the juice in the earth‟s crust transmutes 
various substances into stone.
75
 The last theory was the basis for alchemy—the magical 
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counterpart of chemistry—for it espoused the notion that minerals and metals grow and, 
in the process, become increasingly refined. 
 We can see from the preceding discussion of minerals the reasons why granite 
was an enticing subject matter for one of Rudhyar‟s works. Furthermore, we can see the 
similarities between the theories which people had developed to account for the 
generation of minerals and the concepts from Bergson‟s Creative Evolution that I 
discussed in chapter 2, in particular the idea of the vital impulse. The vital impulse is one 
of the essential characteristics of Rudhyar‟s style, and it is exemplified in Granites.  
The work begins with the following musical cell: 
 
Example 1 Opening Musical Cell from Dane Rudhyar‟s Granites, m. 1 
             
 
 
In Bergsonian terms, this musical cell, in terms of its melodic direction and intervallic 
content, as well as rhythmic and spatial qualities, is the vital impulse of the piece. That is, 
all other gestures in the work are based on this initial impulse. Since the vital impulse 
represents a struggle, and the final result cannot be anticipated, it signifies constant 
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change. Consequently, each of the iterations of the opening musical cell differs from the 
initial one, sometimes in the minutest detail. Example 2 (a) to (d) shows various 
transformations of the vital impulse of the first piece in the cycle: 
 
 
 
Example 2 Transformations of the Vital Impulse of Dane Rudhyar‟s Granites 
 
 
 
 
(a) mm. 2-3 
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(b) m. 4 
 
 
 
(c) m. 10 
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(d) mm. 11-12 
 
 
In Example 2 (a) Rudhyar repeats the vital impulse, but he expands the range downwards 
through the interval of a seventh C-B, and he expands the range upwards. C-B-A plus the 
A minor triad pulsates against A-B-D
b
-E
b
-F, the whole-tone scale. The aural energy is 
enhanced through this juxtaposition of tones.  In Example 2 (b) Rudhyar shortens the 
time value of the F-A and repeats the initial gesture with added dissonant intervals and in 
reduced rhythmic values. He also expands the range by inverting the melodic direction of 
the vital impulse to an upward leap until the musical space is polarized at very high and 
very low registers, without filling the middle space.  
In Example 2 (c) Rudhyar first increases the musical space and the resonance of 
the vital impulse by having it sound in three octaves over a heavy chord and by almost 
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doubling the rhythmic values of the descending gesture, since the lower register would 
naturally resonate longer than the upper. This is an exploitation of the energy of natural 
materials. Second, he states the descending seventh after a rest and adds dissonant 
harmonies, while the rhythm is only slightly altered from a triplet to a sixteenth and 
dotted eighth note plus eighth. In addition, an eighth-note rest follows the block chord; 
finally, the upward inverted gesture from Example 2 (a) is altered rhythmically, while the 
block chord is held for double its length. Then in Example 2 (d), Rudhyar plays with the 
musical space, exploration both high and low registers, but ultimately finishing with the 
lower register and a bare texture of a tritone. In addition, although this is the end of this 
movement, the vital impulse is not reiterated using the same pitches as in the opening, 
even though the melodic direction of the gesture links it back to the opening. 
 Consequently, as we can see from only the few short excerpts from Example 2 
(a)-(d), Bergson‟s concept of the vital impulse is a strong factor in the piece. The motive, 
in all its iterations, is consistently altered, be it through pitches, intervals, rhythm, or 
register. Another aspect which is characteristic of Bergson‟s concept of the vital impulse 
in Rudhyar‟s Granites is the unpredictability of the transformations of the musical cell, 
and consequently, the result of the whole piece. A simple case in point is Example 2 (d), 
in which the melodic interval of the vital impulse is transformed from a seventh to a 
tritone. However, the form of the piece is also unpredictable as a result of these 
continuous changes and the continuous unfolding, or evolution of the piece. The form of 
the piece is most clearly seen in the spatial registers of the Granites. The whole of the 
work and its component parts, such as phrases, are shaped through an expansion of the 
texture, often emphasizing the outer registers and omitting the middle one, followed by a 
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section in which the middle register is exploited, and finally another section that expands 
the texture even further than the first section. Rudhyar used this process to shape the so-
called unpredictable form. Furthermore, the form of the Granites continues throughout all 
of the movements, so that the whole work unfolds through musical space. 
 
First Pentagrams (The Summons): An Example of Bergsonian Duration 
 
We can interpret the rhythmic and metric organization of Rudhyar‟s musical 
compositions as exemplifying the Bergsonian concept of duration. In fact, this is one of 
the most characteristic features of Rudhyar‟s musical style. We will recall that, according 
to Bergson, space and time were frequently misunderstood and confused, and that 
properly said, space was static and time was change. Space would convey a fragmentary 
and sequential form of evolution, will time would equal a continuous process of 
evolution. We can translate this into musical terms: a static, fragmentary and sequential 
form of musical time would be highly metrical, while musical time in terms of 
Bergsonian duration would be so rhythmically fluid that we might perceive it as having 
no meter at all. 
Rudhyar acknowledged the concept of Bergsonian duration in his works. In fact, 
he was preoccupied with expressing music in terms of duration. He admitted to the 
difficulty of fitting the musical flow of time into a medium that was “a straightjacket of 
rigidly defined measures with their strong and weak beats.”76 However, Rudhyar 
manages to evoke the Bergsonian notion of duration through the use of unconventional 
metric signatures and by masking the hierarchical relationships of the rhythmic values 
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within the measure. We can see this clearly in his work, First Pentagrams (The 
Summons). 
Rudhyar composed First Pentagrams (The Summons) in 1974, and although it is 
one of his later works, Bergson‟s philosophical thoughts are still prominent influences on 
the style of his musical compositions. First Pentagrams (The Summons) is symptomatic 
of Rudhyar‟s work in the field of astrology, for which he was very well-known during 
this time in his career. The astrological basis for this work cannot be denied. A pentagram 
is a cycle. It is a five-pentacled star, which first originated from the observations of 
Venus by ancient astronomers. Therefore, it was once associated with the worship of the 
goddess Venus, who was the bringer of inner light and knowledge. The five pentacles 
themselves can either symbolize the five planets of Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, Saturn and 
Venus (the queen of heaven); or they can symbolize the elements of water, earth, air and 
spirit. When viewed from Earth, the successive inferior conjunctions of Venus plot a 
nearly perfect pentagram shape around the zodiac every eight years. 
Rudhyar composed the First Pentagrams (The Summons) as five short piano 
works, each of which represents one of the five pentacles of the pentagram. In each of 
these five short movements, he invokes the Bergsonian concept of duration, as shown in 
Example 3: 
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Example 3 Bergsonian Duration in Dane Rudhyar‟s First Pentagrams (The 
 Summons), “Surging,” mm. 1-4 
 
 
 
As we can see from Example 3, Rudhyar created metric signatures with added half beats, 
and the metric changes occur without any perceptible pattern. The piece begins with a 
5/4
1/2
 time signature, followed by 2/4
1/2
, 5/4
1/2
, ¾, 5/4
1/2
 and 4/4
1/2
. The shifts between the 
various metric signatures with added half beats and complex surface rhythmic activity 
take away the rigidity of metric accents. As Rudhyar stated in his preface to the First 
Pentagrams (The Summons), 
 
I have spoken of it as a “music of speech” to differentiate its substance from 
that of classical music (suites, sonatas, symphonies) which originally came 
from the dance and thus features even rhythms, rigid developmental patterns 
and repetitive statements. If the score contains bars, these are merely for the 
sake of convenience. No strong or weak beats are implied. The flow of 
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music in most instances should have the freedom—yet the consistency and 
directiveness—of the beautiful recitation of a poem.77 
 
 
 
Consequently, Rudhyar avoided exact repetition of thematic and rhythmic modules and 
strove for metric freedom in the First Pentagram (The Summons) as a means of avoiding 
a static sense of time—by promoting continuous change and fluidity, he was composing 
along the lines of Bergson‟s concept of duration. 
 In addition, the Bergsonian notion of duration fit well with Rudhyar‟s work in 
astrology, for it was compatible—and even favorable—to his ideas on cycles and cyclic 
time, and consequently, the title of the work, which represents the cyclic patterning of the 
pentagram, acquires greater significance in light of the composer‟s philosophical and 
spiritual beliefs. I have already discussed the meaning of the pentagram in astrology. But 
a better understanding of Rudhyar‟s concept of cycles will help us better see its 
correlations with Bergson‟s notion of continuous time or duration.  
 Rudhyar defines astrology in this way: 
 
Astrology can be defined as a technique for the study of life-cycles. Its main 
purpose [is establishing] the existence of regular patterns in the sequence of 
events constituting man‟s inner and outer experience; then, to use the 
knowledge of these experiences…Indeed the study of cycles—that is, of 
periodical activities in nature, human and otherwise—is the root of all 
significant knowledge, be it scientific or philosophical. And the study of 
cycles is a study of Time.
78
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Rudhyar speaks of two phases within each cycle. The first half of any cycle is called 
involutionary. This is when a new tone sounds, and while it starts out as formless, a 
form soon emerges until it reaches a culmination at the halfway point, at which point 
the motives have expanded and the musical space has reached its most widely-spread 
out point. It is a form-building process, or in other words, the form is in a process of 
becoming. At the midway mark, the form becomes either evolutionary or 
devolutionary. This depends largely on whether or not the creation of form was 
successful. When an evolutionary path is taken, growth, movement, and development 
of meaning occurs; when a devolutionary path is taken, exact repetition is accompanied 
by stasis and disintegration of form. The quality of tone of the next cycle depends on 
the success of the previous cycle. Rudhyar describes the movement of one cycle into 
the next in an evolutionary cycle as a spiral—as it comes back to its point of departure, 
it crosses it, but does not touch it—it has evolved and continues to evolve. The 
devolutionary cycle, however, is described as a circle—it comes back to its exact point 
of departure, unchanged. Bergson‟s notion of duration is at work in Rudhyar‟s ideas of 
cycles in that continuous change and flow of time is advocated.  
 The first movement of First Pentagram (The Summons), entitled “The Call,” is 
exemplary of both Bergsonian duration and Rudhyar‟s concept of cycles. It contains 
many of the elements of continuous flow such as changing and irregular metric 
signatures. The opening begins with a short two-beat rhythmic and melodic cell—the 
vital impulse of the piece—that employs Rudhyar‟s principle of “cumulative 
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resonances,”79 which allows for the piling up of seconds and other intervals 
traditionally considered dissonant. The opening is shown in Example 4: 
 
Example 4 Opening of Dane Rudhyar‟s First Pentagram (The Summons),  “The Call,”
  m. 1-4 
 
 
 
Each of the repetitions of the vital impulse is varied in some way—much as in Granites. 
Rudhyar‟s concept of life cycles appears at the midway point of the piece at m. 6, 
whereby, after a development of the initial motive into a virtually unrecognizable state, it 
returns, as shown in Example 5: 
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Example 5 Midway Point of Dane Rudhyar‟s First Pentagram (The Summons), “The 
  Call,” mm. 5-14 
 
 
 
 
 
The return of the initial motive is not without change. While the first section was what 
may be called the involuntary stage of the cycle, in which creation of form takes place, 
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the midway point represents the evolutionary stage of the cycle, in which meaning is 
acquired and energy is released. Rudhyar makes the evolutionary process of the cycle, in 
which inexact repetition and continuous growth and movement persists, quite obvious by 
the continuously expanding registral and textural space. The work finally achieves its 
fundamental goal of D in the bass in m. 5 of Example 5, which is also brought into 
greater relief as the first fortissimo chord in the piece, and the triple-forte in m. 10 is the 
moment at which the registral space is the widest. Finally, the cycle returns to its point of 
departure through the interval of a minor second, G#-A in the right hand, while it shows 
the changes it has undergone by including the D, as opposed to the more prominent D
b
 of 
the opening. Rudhyar‟s application of Bergsonian duration to life cycles is fully realized 
musically in “The Call,” producing the spiral shape of evolutionary cycles. 
 
Rudhyar’s Paeans and Aaron Copland: A Disagreement Between Two 
 Composers  
 
 
 Some scholars have noted the similarities between Rudhyar‟s works and Aaron 
Copland‟s Piano Variations, but the relationship between the two pieces has been little 
explored. Carol Oja has acknowledged a connection between Rudhyar and Copland. She 
states: “One of the most surprising cases is Aaron Copland‟s Piano Variations of 1930, 
which shares melodic gestures with one of Rudhyar‟s Granites and conveys a similar 
spacious sense of authority.”80 Furthermore, Oja provides the following description, 
which I cite in its entirety: 
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Also intriguing are the potential connections between the Piano Variations 
of Copland and Granites by Dane Rudhyar. While Rudhyar fancied a 
thickness of texture alien to Copland‟s ear, he produced a body of piano 
music notable for epic statement and angular gestures. Over the course of 
the 1920s, Rudhyar‟s thick masses of sound were pared down a bit, and by 
the time of Granites, composed in August of 1929 in Carmel, California, 
and performed (perhaps premiered) by Rudhyar at a League of Composers 
concert in New York on 2 February 1930, they had become more linear. The 
League concert came just as Copland began immersing himself in the 
Variations (recall that he had moved to Bedford in January for a secluded 
stint). I do not know whether or not he attended Rudhyar‟s premiere. But the 
opening of Granites has a similar enough conception to the Piano 
Variations to warrant attention. Both employ a strong attack, singling out 
individual notes, and both have a similar melodic and rhythmic profile to 
their opening gestures. According to sketches for Copland‟s theme, he had 
already conceived of it before Rudhyar‟s Granites was performed at the 
League; the basic idea was his own. But the shaping of it—gesturally, 
rhythmically, spatially—merits comparison to Rudhyar.  
 
The works intersect again at their conclusions. After an ecstatic buildup that 
was typical for Rudhyar, Granites culminates in a descending three-note 
motive, drawn from the opening, which is punched out before a definitive 
concluding chord. Copland, too, returns to the opening gesture—this time 
with only three notes, yielding a literal reduction of what had occurred at the 
opening. Then he finishes with what seems his own tensile version of a 
Rudhyaresque conclusion: lots of big sounds spanning at the breadth of the 
keyboard, “surging” to a fierce resonance. Copland certainly knew 
Rudhyar‟s earlier works, especially Three Paeans, which was performed on 
a Copland-Sessions concert in May 1928. In other words, there had been 
time for the grandiloquence of Rudhyar to settle in.
81
  
 
However, Rudhyar‟s Three Paeans appears to have had a greater influence than Oja 
implies. In 1929, Aaron Copland wrote a letter to Roger Sessions, in which he mentions 
that he heard the pianist Richard Buhlig perform nine pieces by Rudhyar, including Three 
Paeans.
82
 Thus, when Copland published his Piano Variations in 1930, Rudhyar had 
already composed the Three Paeans (1927) as well as the Granites (1929). The use of 
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musical space in the pieces of both composers is indeed one of the features with the 
greatest similarities. In addition, as stated by Oja, melodic angularity and dissonance are 
also prominent features. Although we might say that Copland was influenced by 
Rudhyar, I find it unlikely that the opposite was true, scholars believe that Rudhyar did 
not agree with Copland‟s Piano Variations.83 The reasons for this are unclear, but I think 
that they reside with the aesthetics of the Piano Variations and may be understood in 
terms of Bergson‟s concept of duration. In Copland‟s Piano Variations, there is an 
opening motive, but this is not really a vital impulse, since Bergson was not talking about 
music or a compositional technique and Copland did not use Bergsonian concepts in his 
aesthetics. However, one of the marking characteristics of Copland‟s Piano Variations is 
its rigidity of rhythm—even though he does employ changes of metric signatures. With 
Copland‟s work, we always perceive the strong and weak beats, while with Rudhyar‟s 
Three Paeans, Granites (as well as the later First Pentagram (The Summons)), we never 
perceive this. Consequently, we can say that Rudhyar adheres to the Bergsonian principle 
of duration, while Copland‟s Piano Variations exhibits a more static, rigid concept of 
time. 
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Conclusions 
 
 Dane Rudhyar was a complex and fascinating figure for the history of American 
music and philosophy of art. While his music was usually misunderstood because of the 
high levels of dissonance and changing textures, and he was criticized for having taken a 
“passionately articulated antiformalist stance,”84 a study of his philosophical influences 
clarifies some of his compositional choices. In particular, a very early influence was that 
of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, whose ideas about creative evolution, intuition 
and intelligence, duration and vital impulse permeate the writings and musical 
compositions of Rudhyar. Once we look at his music from the standpoint of Bergson‟s 
philosophies, we can perceive his compositions as unfolding continuously and fluidly in a 
creative manner, rather than in the haphazard way described by some of Rudhyar‟s 
contemporaries. In addition, when we examine both Rudhyar and Bergson in the 
twentieth-century context of magic, both of these figures begin to acquire even greater 
significance.  
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